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What are the effects of the Large-Scale Asset Purchase 
programs launched by the ECB and the FED? 
 
Abstract 
This Dissertation explores the effects of the large-scale asset purchase programs launched by 
the European Central Bank in 2014 and by the Federal Reserve in 2008 and compare the results 
across the two economies. We start by investigating whether the programs had effects in 
reducing financial market tensions by analyzing the daily behavior of some market indicators 
around important announcement dates. Then, by employing a standard VAR, we analyze the 
impact of an asset purchase shocks in main macroeconomic indicators, such as output and 
prices, and in financial markets indicators, such as bond yields and stock prices. From the first 
analysis, the results suggest that both Central Banks made announcements that had immediate 
effects in reducing bond yields, depreciating the domestic currency and boosting stock prices. 
From the VAR analysis, we conclude that the US program was more effective in rising output, 
inflation and stock prices than the ECB program, and that both programs were able to decrease 
both long term government and corporate bond yields of the respective economy. However, it 
was found stronger evidence for the US dollar depreciation during the US period studied than 
for the euro area domestic currency depreciation during the ECB program. 
 
 
Keywords: Asset purchase program effects, Unconventional monetary policy, VAR, 
Quantitative Easing, Announcement dates 
 




Quais são os efeitos dos programas de compra de activos em 
grande escala lançados pelo BCE e pelo FED? 
 
Resumo 
Esta dissertação explora os efeitos dos programas de compra de activos em grande escala 
lançados pelo Banco Central Europeu (BCE) em 2014 e pela Reserva Federal em 2008 e 
compara os resultados das duas economias. Começamos por investigar se os programas tiveram 
efeitos em reduzir tensões nos mercados financeiros através da análise do comportamento em 
frequência diária de alguns indicadores de mercado, à volta de datas importantes de anúncio. 
Depois, através da aplicação de um standard VAR, analisamos o impacto de choques de 
compras de activos nos principais indicadores macroeconómicos, como o índice industrial e os 
preços de mercado, e em indicadores de mercados financeiros, como o rendimento de 
obrigações e o preço das acções. Da primeira análise, os resultados sugerem que ambos os 
Bancos Centrais fizeram anúncios que tiveram efeitos imediatos em reduzir o rendimento das 
obrigações, em depreciar a moeda doméstica e em subir o preço das acções. Da análise feita 
pelo VAR, conclui-se que o programa dos Estados Unidos da América (EUA) foi mais eficaz 
em aumentar o índice industrial, a inflação e o preço das acções do que foi o programa do BCE, 
e que ambos os programas tiveram sucesso em reduzir o rendimento das obrigações 
governamentais e corporativas da respectiva economia. Contudo, foi encontrada uma mais forte 
evidência da depreciação do dólar americano durante o período do programa dos EUA do que 
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In the wake of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, some of the largest central banks in 
the world (such as the FED and the ECB) had to intervene in the economy in order to reduce 
the tensions that were present around the financial markets. These tensions could dangerously 
jeopardize the global economy and had shaken both the European and American economies. 
To provide monetary stimulus and to tackle the risk of a very prolonged period of low inflation, 
central banks act through a variety of monetary policy measures such as lowering interest rates, 
which is the most common one.  
The FED and the ECB have lowered interest rates to the lower-bound level, exhausting the most 
used instrument of monetary policy so far. In order to effectively respond to the needs that the 
financial crisis have caused, central banks started making large scale asset purchases (LSAP) 
(also known as Quantitative Easing) in order to ensure financial stability and stimulate the 
economy.  
In the case of the ECB, the programs we are focusing in the present dissertation consist of those 
under Asset Purchase Programme (APP1), i.e. the following: corporate sector purchase 
programme (CSPP), public sector purchase programme (PSPP), asset-backed securities 
purchase programme (ABSPP) and the third covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3). An 
underlying aspect of the PSPP is that it is implemented in a decentralized fashion2: the National 
Central Banks (NCBs) are the ones responsible for purchasing 92% of the total amount, leaving 
the remaining 8% to the ECB. The ECB has its purchases limited to government bonds and 
agency securities across all eligible jurisdictions while the NCBs are restricted too, but to 
purchases of domestic bonds issued by the central governments or recognized agencies of their 
own jurisdiction up to limits consistent with the prohibition of monetary financing. 
The size of the APP launched by the ECB (October 2014 to November 2019) was of about 
€2,673 billion and the Fed’s LSAP (March 2009 to December 2014) was around $4,500 billion. 
The effects in Italy of the ECB’s first rounds of asset purchase are considered to have resulted 
into increased investment by firms, that saw their cost of capital lowered, and increased 







Given that the results of these unconventional policy measures belong to our present, as both 
programs have ended not so long ago, it was found interesting to approach the topic of Central 
Bank asset purchases for several reasons. First, it is now possible to update the ECB dataset 
with a more recent data and explore the effects of the euro area APP until 2019. Also, through 
performing a financial and macroeconomic comparative analysis of both programs it is possible 
to take conclusions regarding their effectiveness including a time period when both economies 
were recovering from the financial crisis.  
The analysis developed in this dissertation  focus on the identification of an asset purchase 
shock and used as methodology the Vector-Autoregression (VAR), where there were made 
several different models with and without applying restrictions, each of them with two 
macroeconomic variables to evaluate the effects on output and prices and adding several other 
variables, such as bond yields and stock indices, to evaluate the effects on the financial markets. 
In addition, it was also carried a daily data analysis to test the response of some of these 
variables on the announcements made by the CB’s regarding the asset purchases. The main 
concluding remarks to bear in mind from the analysis are that the Fed’s program was far more 
effective to boost output and inflation levels than the ECB’s during the period studied; there is 
evidence of decreasing bond yields (both sovereign and corporate) resulting from a shock 
associated to these asset purchases for both economies; and there is evidence that these shocks 
have impacted the stock markets and the effective exchange rate in opposite directions for the 
two economies such that it has depreciated (appreciated) the American (European) domestic 
currency and it has a positive (negative) impact on the American (European) stock markets. 
Having as a research question for the present dissertation an assessment on the effects of asset 
purchase programs for both euro area and US economies, the analysis is structured as follows: 
section 1 introduces to the context where both programs took place and provides a broad picture 
on the policy monetary measures; section 2 offers a diversified literature review grouped into 
three parts: 2.1 aims to explore some of the previous main transmission mechanisms tested from 
which these policies are transmitted into the economy and financial markets, 2.2 offers a notion 
of recent methodologies used addressing to the effects of asset purchases in the financial 
markets and economy while 2.3 ends the section by providing some of the previous empirical 
findings on these effects. We then start section 3 by presenting our standard VAR model and 
empirical set-up used to explore the asset purchases effects along with all the data retrieved; in 
section 4 the findings on the effects of asset purchases on financial market tensions are shown, 




the Fed regarding the effects those announcements had on some of the financial markets 
indicators also used in our VAR model. Section 5 provides the results found in the VAR 
analysis through an evaluation of the impulse response functions found for the set of variables 
tested and section 6 provides some of the important concluding remarks to bear when exploring 
the effects of asset purchases. 
 
2. Literature Review 
This next section aims to provide an overview of the literature on the asset purchases effects 
and how these are transmitted to the financial markets, reviewing also the methods followed by 
different studies, so that the approach and results achieved in the present dissertation can be 
compared and contextualized.  
 
2.1 Main Transmission Channels 
 
The central banks’ asset purchases are transmitted to the economy through several channels. 
The first category of channels that we will see in this section is the signaling channel, which is 
considered as one of the most influent channels of monetary policy transmission (Bauer and 
Rudebusch (2014)). This channel operates through the monetary authority’s commitment to its 
mandate and it can impact the economy and the financial markets in different ways. This 
channel is activated by influencing market expectations regarding future short-term interest 
rates as the long-term maturity assets purchased by the CB’s lead to a long period of higher 
liquidity. The perceived commitment of the central bank can also anchor or boost inflation 
expectations. The result of higher inflation expectations will be lower real long-term interest 
rates, that will ultimately increase investment and consumption. To sum up, we could say that 
this channel when activated signals to the financial markets that an expansionary asset purchase 
program makes interest rates remaining at a lower level for a longer period showing 
commitment of the monetary authority to maintain its price stability objective. 
Another transmission channels through which these massive purchases are expected to work is 
the portfolio rebalancing channel. This channel is based on the creation of incentives for 
institutions to rebalance their portfolios into, in particular, riskier assets, benefiting agents 




preferred habitat, i.e. investors prefer, for instance, a given maturity in the bond market causing 
imperfect substitutability between assets (Vayanos and Villa, 2009). If bonds and central bank 
reserves were perfect substitutes, the purchases would have no effect (Joyce et al., 2012). There 
is evidence suggesting that the portfolio rebalancing channel was activated and transmitted to 
the financial markets during the asset purchase programs of economies where LSAPs where 
made, represented by the decreasing yields of both assets purchased and not purchased during 
the program (United States evidence see Gagnon et el. 2011, for the UK see Joyce et al. 2014).  
Andrade et al. (2016) states that the asset valuation channel (also called portfolio rebalancing 
channel through the notion that a variation in asset prices will cause a change in the investors’ 
optimal share of those assets) can be activated through two ways. First, it suggests that an 
increase in the average duration of the government bonds purchased would lead to a decrease 
in the duration risk from the private sector, as longer maturities bonds would belong to the 
Central Banks’s balance sheet. The second relies on the assumption that the spread of those 
government bonds is related to the investors’ leverage constraints or risk bearing capacity as 
mentioned by Vayanos and Villa (2009). An example could be that this constraint is present 
when investors face value-at-risk constraint (Adrian and Shin, 2014) given that a central bank 
large asset purchase will reduce the price of the market risk and hence, inducing a relaxation in 
the risk constraint. 
Besides the portfolio rebalancing, there are other indirect effects that are triggered through 
changes on interest rates. The fact that there is more domestic currency circulating in an 
economy, it will depreciate it in relation to other currencies, activating the called exchange rate 
channel. Gambetti and Musso (2017) found evidence on the activation of this channel during 
the ECB program and have the opinion that this channel can be seen as a particular category 
within the portfolio rebalancing channel as domestic residents may increase its demand for 
external assets. 
Some macroeconomic effects around QE have been studied and there is evidence that it can 
indeed stimulate the economy through these channels. Furthermore, most authors that research 
on APP support that the portfolio rebalancing channel is amongst the most influent channels in 
monetary policy transmission to the financial markets (Altavilla et al. (2016) for the euro area 
and Gagnon et al. (2011) for the US). 
In the present dissertation we assess the portfolio rebalancing channel through the impact on 




channel through the evaluation of the variations in the effective exchange rate during the 
LSAPs. 
 
2.2 Different methodologies accessing the effects of LSAPs 
 
To assess the effects in the economy and in the financial markets of these unconventional 
monetary policies, several methodologies can be applied.  
Event study methodologies are also widely used approaches to study monetary policy 
transmission, being worth mentioning Joyce et al. (2011) and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2018). Joyce 
el al. (2011) addresses to the risk of performing an event study analysis considering an 
inappropriate window length. In their results on the UK economy, it is highlighted that choosing 
a one-day over a two-day window have considerably halved the results. In light of such possible 
misapplications, it was decided in the present dissertation not to carry out solely with an event 
study analysis to assess the asset purchases effects in the economy and in the financial markets. 
Gambetti and Musso (2017) brought a model that allows for important changes in the economy, 
such as periods ranging from the GFC to a transition where interest rates are at the ZLB, 
allowing the model to be flexible in these terms. Their approach is a time-varying VAR with 
stochastic volatility that seems to be appropriate given the uncertainty lived in the economic 
behavior and in monetary policy rules, but the high computational costs inherited to the model 
assumes an important factor to consider when choosing the approach. Considering the 
advantages and disadvantages of this approach, it seemed reasonable not to follow it in the 
present dissertation given the relatively short time frame captured in our analysis (5 to 6 years) 
that doesn’t require such computational costs to capture major structural changes in the 
economy or volatility. 
A different methodology is explored by Beck, Duca and Stracca (2019) to study the causal 
effect of QE policies on financial outcome variables. They apply an augmented inverse 
probability weighting (AIPW) estimator that addresses potential endogeneity by re-
randomising the sample using propensity score estimators. They perform the study by applying 
local projections to the re-randomised sample so that they can evaluate the treatment and side 
effects. The lack of familiarity with this approach and the large number of observations that is 




Gambacorta et. al (2014) studies the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policies by 
exploring the cross-sectional dimension of eight economies (Canada, the euro area, Japan, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) at a time where 
economies were at the ZLB. The cross-sectional dimension is done through a panel VAR which 
makes sense given the high number of economies. This methodology makes it possible to test 
whether there is correlation across the residuals among the different economies while monetary 
policy shocks can be simultaneously identified, allowing also to consider the differences in the 
transmission mechanisms of monetary policy across the economies. Given that the present 
dissertation is only focusing in two economies, in two different time frames, it makes little sense 
to adopt this method in our analysis. 
The approach followed in the present dissertation was influenced on the work of the previous 
author, but it gives also special relevance on the work of Weale and Wieladek (2016). There 
are three main underlying differences: they analyze two economies that are launching LSAP 
within the same time frame (USA and UK), they have a combination of sign and time 
restrictions for their four identification schemes tested, and lastly, they employ a Bayesian VAR 
approach developed by Uhlig (2005) and Peersman (2005).  
Considering the different methodologies approached to study unconventional monetary policy, 
the present dissertation employs a standard VAR with a lag of 2 (two) as it was found and used 
by these previously mentioned authors to be the appropriate value for the analysis considered. 
We then proceed to the evaluation of the results by looking at the impulse response functions 
in our different set ups considered and that will be carefully detailed further in this paper. 
 
2.3 Empirical findings on LSAPs and its effectiveness 
 
There are several studies with empirical evidence on the results of LSAPs and its advantages 
and disadvantages. Overall, a continuous rise in asset prices is expected and this effect is larger 
on the presence of financial distressed conditions (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2013)). Most authors agree that an expansionary asset purchase program contributes to a 
decrease in the financial market tensions such as the presence of highly volatile markets and 
financial distressed conditions. 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2018) focused on unconventional monetary policies in countries such as the 




effectiveness during financial distress and the convincing significant impact of the policies in 
both financial conditions and macro variables. The effectiveness is measured through inflation, 
policy rates, GDP and central bank assets in order to assess the capacity demonstrated during 
the period studied in preventing further financial distress, restoring the normal functioning of 
the financial markets, and providing additional monetary stimulus by lowering long-term 
interest rates. The above conclusions reached are based on government borrowing costs and 
policy rates evolution across different countries and relating that evolution with the observed 
levels of output, long-term government yields and prices. 
Beck et al. (2019) findings are in line with the previous authors on an important and motivating 
evidence that these nonstandard policies bring no major side effects and increases in risk. 
Through a cross country analysis with a panel data of 41 countries, they reach to two important 
conclusions that QE (1) did not increase or fall significatively real house prices and real credit 
to the private sector and (2) there is no evidence of particularly large shifts in capital flows. 
These conclusions appear to be in favor of unconventional monetary policies and thus a better 
understanding of its effectiveness and impact is highly desirable to all economic agents. 
There is empirical evidence supporting that QE contributed to boost the economy and ease 
monetary conditions through lower bond yields, credit risk spreads and interbank rates as 
specified in Borio and Zabai (2016) with an analysis of the European, American, English and 
Japanese economies.  
In the UK, the purchase of long-term government bonds through the LSAP encouraged 
institutional investors into replacing holdings of government bonds by corporate bonds, thus 
decreasing the yields on both securities. Evidence for the US (Gagnon et al. (2011)) and for the 
UK (Joyce et al. 2014) shows that the effect of LSAP not only affected long term treasury 
securities but also corporate bond yields, by about the same amount. One could infer that this 
low tradeoff between both public and private sector assets is given by the lower credit risk 
premiums and improved economic prospects that the asset purchases bring to the economy. 
Altavilla et al (2016) show that long term government bond yields have decreased significantly 
by evaluating ECB’s January 2015 announcement, at a time when the degree of financial market 
stress was relatively low. The authors highlight that the strength of the channels of transmission 
might differ across liquidity and risk regimes as investor’s effectiveness to integrate across 
different segments in the market as QE takes place, is related with its risk bearing capacity. We 




increasing asset prices in the presence of  high financial distress (Dell’Ariccia et al. (2018)) 
through portfolio rebalancing channel, but these authors concluded that during periods of low 
distress (2015), the weak local supply channel has facilitated spill-overs to non-targeted assets 
such as corporate bonds.  
Haldane et al. (2016) explores the effects of asset purchase shocks and relate the shock with the 
state of the financial markets, for the US and UK over the same period. They follow a similar 
VAR approach as the one employed in this dissertation (Weale and Wieladek (2016)) 
concluding that the effects of the shocks are larger in periods when market stress is high and 
smaller when it is low. The results are achieved using a sub-sample analysis comparing the 
shock effects captured in 2007-2010 with the ones captured from 2010 onwards, when market 
stress is lower. 
The results achieved by the authors that have employed similar or different approaches on VAR 
models (Weale and Wieladek (2016), Hesse, Hofmann and Weber (2017), Gambetti and Musso 
(2017)) lead all to similar results. They conclude that an asset purchase shock lead to a small 
but persistent increase in output and on prices.  
Ferrero and Cova (2015) come to interesting conclusions when stating that the impact of the 
APP on prices comes directly from the exchange rate channel. The results are due to the greater 
competitiveness on prices and acceleration in economic activity attributable to the depreciation 
of the euro. 
The US asset purchase program differs from the ECB’s in some respects such as the asset class 
purchased and time frame for example. But when considering the MBS (mortgage-backed 
securities)3 program that only had place in the US, studies demonstrate that the LSAP’s had 
impact through other channels like scarcity and capital constraints channel (Krishnamurthy and 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2013)).  
It is also seen in this paper that effects on long term rates will affect asset prices such as stocks 
or exchange rates, to the extent that these represent the expected discounted stream of future 
cash flow and so, a change in these rates will generate a new price equilibrium. This increase 
 
3 MBS are different from government or corporate bonds as these are subject to “prepayment risk” (Bhattarai and 
Neely (2016)) meaning that the mortgage holders can prepay their mortgage without penalty. This feature works 
just like a call option: the holder will call the option if long interest rates decline below the yield on the MBS as it 




in bond prices (decrease in yields) and in asset prices is quite often mentioned in literature as a 
natural consequence of QE. 
 
3. Data and Empirical set-up 
To perform the analysis, it was followed the standard Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) approach 
with a lag4 of two months to access the effects of asset purchases in the Euro area and in the 
United States throughout the period of October 2014 to September 2019 and October 2008 to 
December 2014, respectively. The window length chosen for this analysis was based on the 
initial and end periods of unconventional monetary policy measures adopted by the respective 
Central Banks (ECB and FED) as shown in figure 1 and figure 2, represented in the ECB’s and 
Fed’s increase in balance sheets assets. 
 
Figure 1 - purchases for the ECB under the 




4 Lags of 6 and 4 were also considered for robustness check, but the results were not significatively different from 
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Figure 2 - cumulative result of permanent open market operations. 




Below in figure 3 we can find the relative size of the ECB’s and the FED’s balance sheet assets 
relative to its GDP in its respective local currency (€ and $).  
 
Figure 3 – Ratio of Assets/GDP for the euro area and USA. Source ECB: ECB SDW and Eurostat. Source Fed: 
FRED website 
Note: for the ECB, we considered as assets the sum of two Eurosystem’s series: the securities of euro area residents 
denominated in euro plus the series that represent lending to euro area credit institutions related to monetary 
policies. For the Fed, we considered as assets the series Total Assets (less eliminations from consolidation). Black 
marks represent the implementation (by phases the USA case) of the program studied in the analysis. 
 
To shed some light regarding the magnitude of previous LSAPs in different economies, it is 
known that the size of the Fed’s balance sheet assets in relation to US Nominal Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) has been increasing periodically since 2008 as it is seen in the graph. Moreover, 
as a reflection of the unconventional policy measures taken to provide liquidity and ensure 
financial and macroeconomic stability, the ECB since 2010 has undertaken programs such as 
the Securities Market Program (SMP) and two covered bond purchase programs (CBPP1 and 
CBPP2). The last of these programs to be undertaken was CBPP2 that ended by the end of 
2012, when the Eurosystem’s policy assets reached about 75% of GDP. The focus in the present 
analysis will be on the APP (as it was already mentioned), and therefore it is excluded the period 
when the ECB launched the just mentioned programs, in order not to bias the results concerning 
the APP solely, that only started in October 2014 (ECB’s graph black mark) and taking the 
form of monthly purchases. Since this date, we can see a large increase in the ratio from 40% 
to around 120% at end of the period studied. During the period studied, the ECB conducted 
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securities. During the CSPP, ABSPP and CBPP3 the ECB bought respectively, corporate sector 
bonds, asset-backed securities and covered bonds while during the PSPP, the purchases include 
nominal and inflation-linked central government bonds and bonds issued by recognized 
agencies, regional and local governments, international organizations and multilateral 
development banks located in the euro area. 
In the case of the FED, the programs considered can be distinguished into four phases: QE1, 
QE2, MEP (maturity extension program) and QE3. The Q1 and MEP involved purchases of 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), agency debt and Treasury securities while the other two 
programs focused on singularly purchasing one type of these assets at a time: QE2 focused only 
on purchases of Treasuries and QE3 only on MBS. The first black mark in the Fed’s graph 
correspond to the beginning of QE1  (November 2008), that is followed in March 2009 by 
which is considered to be one of the most important but economically harsh announcements as 
the Fed declared that would purchase additional assets ($1,150 billion) beyond the purchases 
already announced by the end of 2008, reflecting poor economic prospects. The second mark 
corresponds to the beginning of QE2 at the end of 2010.  The last mark shown in the graph 
corresponds to the beginning of QE3 in September 2012 when the Fed stated that the goal set 
was to purchase $40 billion of MBS per month as long as “the outlook for the labor market does 
not improve substantially… in the context of price stability”. 
As mentioned, the analysis is based on a VAR that takes the form: 
•  Yt = α + A(L)Yt-1 + Bεt 
where Yt is a vector of endogenous variables, α is a vector of constants, A(L) a matrix 
polynomial in the lag operator L, and B is the contemporaneous impact matrix of the mutually 
uncorrelated shocks εt. The variables present in the model are all in monthly frequency, but 
some of them differ across the two economies as the proxys considered are different. 
For the ECB case, it was considered the logarithm of Industrial Production Index (Indprod) as 
a measure of output; the measure of prices is the logarithm of Harmonized Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP) excluding food and energy (in order to diminish the exogenous impact of oil 
price shocks); the IBOXX Break-even inflation-linked (BEIR) yield, the 10-year AAA and All 
(issuers and ratings) government bond yields for the euro area and the IBOXX euro corporates 




rate (REER) to measure domestic currency depreciation; the logarithm of the 
EUROSTOXX600 Index as Stock Prices and the cumulative APP series to measure the shock.  
Three IBOXX bond indices were used, for both European and American corporate bond yields 
and for the inflation-linked yield (BEIR) as they offer good benchmarking, regular market 
segment reviews and transparency. The euro IBOXX indices are market-value-weighted and 
are based on real-time prices while the US IBOXX indices are volume-weighted and are based 
on US end of day prices. All the IBOXX indices are calculated on the last calendar day of each 
month irrespective of holidays and weekends. 
The two 10-year maturity government bond yields that were used in the estimation of the VAR 
model are taken from the yield curve spot rate, continuous compounding, yield error 
minimization, provided by the ECB. The underlying difference between these two yields is the 
group of issuers, where in one are considered all euro area issuers independently of the rating 
and in the other only AAA-rated issuers are included. Variables were used in real terms. The 
EER and BEIR are already in real terms, the yields and the stock prices were deflated with the 
HICP. 
For the USA, it was considered the logarithm of Industrial Production Index (Indprod) as a 
measure of output; the logarithm of personal consumption expenditures as prices (PCE) as the 
measure for prices; the 10-year Government bond yield, the 10-year Treasury inflation-indexed 
Securities (TIPS) and the IBOXX USD corporates bond yield to measure the reaction in the 
bond markets; the logarithm of Trade Weighted US Dollar Index to measure domestic currency 
depreciation; the logarithm of the S&P500 Index as stock prices and the Securities held outright 
in the Federal Reserve balance sheet to measure the asset purchase shock. The choice to use the 
PCE as prices is justified by being the reference measure used by the Fed to assess its inflation 
objective, and it offers a wider group of expenses than the Consumer Price Index (CPI) such as 
employer related health care expenses. Variables were also used in real terms. The TIPS were 
already in real terms but the bond yields, the exchange rate and the stock prices were deflated 
with the PCE. 
To have comparable results across the two economies, we also compute the ratio of the 
cumulative asset purchase series over the 2015Q1 value of GDP (value of first quarter of 2015 
nominal Gross Domestic product) for the ECB and 2009Q1 value of GDP for the Fed, to 
measure the asset purchase impulse response. The results observed under this view should be 




prices and asset purchases) after an asset purchase shock that is equal to 1% of the nominal 
GDP in the respective quarter. 
The sources used for the variables retrieved can be seen in the appendix. 
 
4. Empirical analysis of the LSAPs 
 4.1 Empirical evidence of impact on financial market tensions 
 
There are several ways to identify how an economy is reacting to certain policy measures and 
to take conclusions regarding its possibilities of overcoming from economic recession. In order 
to analyze how are the financial markets’ reactions to news, one could look at the volatility 
indexes, as the VSTOXX and the VIX (for a more detailed discussion of the VIX and its 
interpretation, see Whaley (2009)). VIX and VSTOXX are measures of implied volatility in the 
S&P500 and Eurostoxx50 indices options, respectively. Thus, they are a measure of future 
uncertainty regarding the underlying asset prices, in this case, the stock indices. Taking this into 
account, it is seen that there is a tendency for the volatility associated with the stock markets 
(both European and American economies) to decrease during the period when the APP and the 
Federal Reserve’s QE programs took place (figures 4, 5 and 6). 
   
 
Note: For the VSTOXX and CISS graphs, we considered a time frame from 2013 to 2019 to evaluate the effects 
in the 22/01/2015, 09/03/2015 and 10/03/2016 ECB’s announcements. For the VIX graph we considered a time 
frame from 2008 to 2014 to evaluate the effects of the 25/11/2008, 18/03/2009 and 22/05/2012 Fed’s 
announcements. Black marks represent the value of each indicator at each announcement date. 
Figure 4 – VSTOXX (daily) | Source: stoxx.com 
 
 










In the above three graphs, there are black lines that mark some of the important announcements 
that were made by the ECB (for fig4 and fig6) and by the Fed (for fig5) in order to easily explore 
the movements in these indicators around the announcement dates. For the ECB, we look at 
variations around 22 January 2015 (announcement on implementation of the PSPP), 9 March 
2015 (implementation of the PSPP) and 10 March 2016 (announcement on implementation of 
the CSPP). For the Fed, we look to variations around 25 November 2008 (first announcement 
of purchases), 18 March 2009 (announcement of additional purchasing volume) and 22 May 
2013 (announcement of decreasing purchasing volume). 
Across the three indicators, there was a similarity found in the way their movements occurred 
after the first announcement dates considered (ECB’s 22 January 2015 and the Fed’s 25 
November 2008): whether it was the ECB’s or Fed’s first announcement of asset purchases, 
there was a  decrease common among the three indicators (VSTOXX, VIX and CISS) after that 
first announcement date. 
It is noticeable that the decrease in volatility associated with the American stock markets is 
more acute, but it is arguable whether this so clear decrease was emphasized by the extremely 
high markets tensions that were predominant by the end of the year of 2008, around the time 
when the investment bank Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy took place, shaking the global 
economy. 
Financial markets volatility can have contagion effects across markets and have systemic 
consequences to the overall economy. If we look at the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress 
(CISS) for the euro area (fig6), that captures more broadly financial stress in the euro area, we 
can see that for the period when the ECB’s APP took place, the CISS decreased substantially. 
Although the effect is not immediate, it is a normal reaction given the instability present in the 





stock markets, that non-conventional policies have a moderate effect over systemic stress 
conditions in the short-term. 
  
4.2 Immediate impact of announcements on financial markets 
 
In the following section, we take a look closer to some of the financial markets variables 
analyzed (10y government bond yield and effective exchange rate for both economies) and 
assess the variations these had around the dates when important announcements regarding 
disclosure and implementation of the APP took place. It was also taken a greater look at the 
first two important announcement dates from the Fed as there were found some interesting 
direct effects in some variables. To do this, we used daily data on the variables to account for 
daily changes and there were considered the important announcement dates just mentioned in 
the previous section (4.1). 
For the period considered, the evolution found in the variables are described in graphs below 
(figure 7 and 8) and the correspondent table with the values around the announcement dates can 
be found in the appendix 1 and 2. 
 By looking at the daily variations across the euro area variables, it is seen that around the first 
announcement date (22/01/2015), the EER and the bond yield see an immediate decrease that 
persists in the following days, while the eurostoxx600 index sees an increase. The 2-day and 1-
week variation for the EER are -1.94% and -1.25%, respectively for the first announcement 
while for the second announcement, these two variations increase to the same value of -2%. 
Regarding the government bond yield, it is seen a strong decrease for the same 2-day and 1-
week variation for the first two announcements considered (around the -14 and -16 basis 
points). For the eurostoxx600 index we see a stronger increase for the same two variations (2-
day variation of 3.98% and 1-week variation of 2.4%) but only verified for the first 
announcement date. As said, the same negative effect is present in the two decreasing variables 
(EER and bond yield) which strengthens the already seen in literature arguments of asset 
purchases having the effects of decreasing bond yields and depreciating the domestic currency 
(Gambetti and Musso (2017)). With the 2016 announcement, the effect observed comes to be 
less strong and in opposite direction for these two variables, while it pushes up the stock markets 




After the day of the first ECB announcement considered, it is possible to verify that these two 
variables have a decreasing trend at least until the next announcement (9 March 2015), date 
when the PSPP was implemented: the Government bond yield fell from 1.09 to 0.83 and the 
effective exchange rate fell from 93.96 to 90.15. Following the implementation, the bond yield 
starts rising as a presumable consequence of the markets reacting to the asset purchases, but the 
exchange rate continues at low stable levels, seeing a slow but positive increase. Later, when 
the CSPP is announced in the beginning of 2016, the yield sees a downward trend the following 
6 months while the exchange rate maintains its relatively stable but increasing level, probably 
reflecting the continuing commitment of the ECB on keeping a loose monetary policy stance. 
Of course, many other factors besides policy decisions and implementation were relevant 
drivers of asset prices during the period considered.  
The daily variations observed in the US variables for the first announcement considered 
(25/11/2008) are stronger for the bond and stock markets. The TIPS see an immediate and 
persistent decrease until the end of the month, having a strong variation in the day of the 
announcement of -32 b.p, -51 b.p for the 2-day variation and -113 b.p. for the 1-week variation, 
while stock prices also see relevant effects but in the opposite direction. As said, in the first 
announcement, the stock prices see a strong increase of 4.2% in the 2-day variation but in the 
second announcement, it is in the 1-week variation that is seen the strongest variation (4.86%). 
The second announcement also impacts the EER, but the effects are less strong that in the yield 
and stock prices. The EER sees a decrease of -1.86% and of -1.24% for the 2-day and 1-week 
variation. Around the last announcement considered, there were no considerably significant 
movements on the variables studied. 
In the Fed’s program, there is a clear decrease in the TIPS yield upon the first two 
announcements studied. The TIPS yield mark 2.79% dated at the first announcement date, since 
then it decreases to 1.90% marked the day before the second announcement. On the next day 
(18 March 2009), the Fed announces additional purchasing volume and this yield decreases 
significantly to 1.28% suggesting a direct relationship between the announcements and the yield 
movements. The exchange rate does not see such a direct effect upon the first announcement, 
it steadily grows at the announcement day and it only starts decreasing after two weeks, but 
there is a noticeable effect on this variable on the second announcement day. Moreover, since 
this announcement that the variable sees a persistent decreasing trend lasting for the following 




EURO AREA                                                             USA 
 
Figure 8 – Daily frequency data on some variables employed in VAR model (YIELD, EXCH and STOCKS) 
| Source euro area: ECB SDW and Thomson Reuters Eikon | Source USA: Fred website and Thomson 
Reuters Eikon 
Note: the loss of information shown in the graph is due to the approximation made in the vertical axis that was 




5. Results of the VAR analysis 
5.1 Identification of asset purchase shocks 
 
The endogenous variables used in our model reflect the notion that the variables are sticky in 
the short run, meaning that output and prices feel no immediate effect after the impact of a 
monetary policy shock. The shock identified in the present dissertation is reflected through the 
variable “appseries” and “ratio” which represents the consecutive cumulative (monthly) rounds 
of asset purchase done by the ECB/FED and the ratio of this value by the respective GDP 
quarter valued at the beginning of each of programmes (Hesse, Hofmann and Weber (2017)). 
The impulse response associated with the variable “ratio” to the remaining variables present in 
the model will give the responses following an asset purchase shock that is equal to 1% of the 
respective GDP. 
The assumption that the impact on output and prices is not immediate is commonly used in 
monetary policy transmission literature and was first presented by Christiano et al. (1996, 
1999). It is possible to justify this choice for two main reasons: first, output will only see a 
strong and persistent impulse response if prices are sticky for a long time (Klaeffing 2003); 
secondly, this assumption is seen by many authors as offering a convenient way to disentangle 
the asset purchase shock from aggregate demand and supply shocks (Weale and Wieladek 
(2016)).  
We apply restrictions in the model, to represent the aforementioned effect that prices and output 
are sticky in the short run and therefore, will not be affected upon impact but through lagged 
effects. This is done by employing zero-restrictions in the first two macroeconomic variables 
in the model (Output and Prices) so that the shock on these variables is not mixed with aggregate 
demand and supply shocks. It is also carried an analysis without imposing any restrictions to 
find out whether the differences are significantly informative or not. 
Weale and Wieladek (2016) explore the macroeconomic impact of asset purchases through four 
different identification schemes, which allows for the identification of an asset purchase shock 
in different perspectives. We base our identification scheme in the first scheme presented in 
this paper, which applies solely zero-restrictions in some variables with the objective of 
representing the above described effect of price stickiness. The remaining three identification 
schemes adopted in the paper are explored through imposing sign restrictions, a mixture of sign 




This section aims to present the several results achieved through the application of the VAR 
model in both European and American economies. A more detailed look was given to the effect 
on the variation in some of the endogenous variables. 
In the ECB case, it was performed a sensitivity analysis on the effect of the APP shock on 10-
year government bond market relatively to the rating of the euro area countries. This is done by 
looking at the impulse responses of two different VAR models, where in one the variable tested 
is the yield on only AAA-issuers governments, while in the other model, we replace the variable 
by the yield on all issuers, independently of their rating. 
Since the euro area represents a large group of 19 countries, that was hit by the sovereign debt 
crisis just before the start of the APP and was still suffering from the effects of market 
fragmentation, it made sense to make this distinction to account for differences in the financial 
markets reactions to the APP when looking separately to high rating countries (such as Germany 
or the Netherlands) or to all of them as a group. It is also made a third analysis of the bond 
markets by employing the VAR with the euro inflation-linked yield in order to confirm the 
results with a different measure of real bond yields. 
Several models5 were estimated, in which some were computed using the euro area data and 
others using the American. The remaining differences in the models are related to small 
variations in some of the variables used to account for possible information related with the 
change, the unit in which the asset purchase shock is identified, the time horizon and we have 
also run the model with and without the already mentioned 0 restrictions. 
 
5.2 Results without restrictions (asset purchase shock equal to 1% of GDP 
level)6 
 
The results on output and prices for the euro area are broadly in line with previous results on 
asset purchases effectiveness, such as Weale and Wieladek (2016), Hesse, Hofmann and Weber 
(2017), Gambetti and Musso (2017)), meaning that they see persistent and positive increases as 
a result of an asset purchase shock. However, we see the results for the USA to be larger than 
 
5 Results found using a longer time horizon can be found in the appendix 
6 The results from Eviews10 show the median responses within the 95% confidence intervals. Measuring the shock 
equal to one Cholesky standard deviation is also a common way to analyze the effects of unconventional monetary 





in the euro area and larger than what is usually found in the literature. Regarding output results 
in the euro area (figures 9, 10 and 11)7, following a 1% of GDP shock in asset purchases, it is 
seen a peak impact of 0.18% 3 months after, although not significant, and steadily increases 
until 0.2%, suggesting a permanent effect of output from the APP. Prices rise following the 
APP start with peak at 0.41% and continuing at positive values, suggesting also a permanent 
effect of close to 0.2%. In the USA (figures 12 and 13), output saw a short-lived negative 
immediate impulse of -0.5%, probably reflecting the delayed response of output to the shock, 
but from month 2 onwards it rises with a peak of 1.5% from month 10 onwards. Prices see a 
persistent increase at about 0.9% from month 8 onwards. Based on the results achieved using 
the same lag length (2) but with a longer time horizon (2 years), we conclude that both effects 
on output and prices seem to be persistent and significant one year after the asset purchases 
shock.  The same conclusion cannot be taken from the remaining variables present in the VAR, 
whose effects seem to go towards 0 after 1 year. 
Relatively to the shock effects on the bond markets for the euro area, the APP seems to have 
induced a fall in long-term bond yields in real terms, irrespectively of the measure of yields 
used. The impulse responses using the BEIR (figure 9) are only slightly different from those 
when using the AAA (figure 10) or all issuers (figure 11) 10-year government bond yield. In 
the specification with the BEIR, it is seen a short-lived peak impact of -9.4bp at month 2 and 
increasing towards 0 afterwards, while in the specification with the deflated bond yields the 
impact is stronger, significant and it seems to be permanent at around -15bp. When changing 
the variable representing the 10-year government bond yield, whether it is a top-rated issuer or 
not, the results found were basically the same, meaning that the asset purchase shock had a 
similar impact across different sovereign issuers.  
 





Figure 9 – Euro area model using BEIR (1y time horizon) | Eviews10 
 





Figure 11 – Euro area model using all ratings issuers bond yield (1y time horizon) | Eviews10 
 
About the effects in the US bond markets, it is seen that the impact of the shock is larger than 
in the euro area and different in the first periods. The VAR results suggest an immediate 
increase in yields, contrary to what could be anticipated, that vanes out through time. When 
using the TIPS in the model (figure 12), the effect is null at the end of the horizon, while the 
effect is negative and significant when using the deflated 10-year government bond yield (-
140bp).  
The results on bond markets are in favor of the portfolio rebalancing channel and they are 
complemented by the additional analysis on the corporate bond markets. The results are again 
quite stronger on the USA than in the euro area. The European corporate bond yields see a 
similar impulse reaction across all unrestricted models (figures 9, 10 and 11) of about -12bp, 
persistent and significant over most of the 12-month horizon and in a similar path to the 
government bond yields. the impact on American corporates bond yields is also similar to the 
impact on government bond yields, with a strong and significant decrease one year after the 
shock, maintaining at -190 bp after period 8 (figures 12 and 13). It is noticeable that when the 
model is executed with the American 10-year government instead of the TIPS, the corporate 




Treasury yields. Overall, the results suggest a contagion of the impact in the sovereign bond 
market, the one where central bank purchases were made, to the corporate bond market in 
similar magnitudes.  
The other channel of transmission tested is the exchange rate channel, through which a 
depreciation of the domestic currency is expected by measures of an expansionary 
unconventional monetary policy, similarly to interest rate policy. There is little evidence on the 
activation of this channel in the euro area, as opposed to Gambetti and Musso (2017): the 
effective exchange has a similar behavior across all unrestricted models (figures 9, 10 and 11): 
there is a negative short-lived impulse (-0.2%) in the first 4 periods, but not significant, but then 
the euro appreciates slightly up to 0.2% in the following periods. Evidence on the American 
effective exchange rate depreciation is clearer in the months after the shock, with a larger 
magnitude than in the euro area, but it fades away over time and is not statistically significant 
(figures 12 and 13).  
In line with the portfolio rebalancing theory, it should be expected an appreciation of equity 
markets. Recent literature on empirical analysis of QE indeed shows that adopting 
unconventional policy measures have persistent positive effects in stock markets. The VAR 
results do not support this hypothesis for the euro area, as European stock markets had a non-
significant negative short-lived peak impact of around -1.7% (figure 9) reached during the 
initial phase of the program, and that it stabilized towards 0 afterwards. In contrast, for the USA 
we found a persistent increase in stock prices during the first 3 to 4 periods at 12% (figure 12) 
and 8.6% (figure 13). 
One of the reasons behind these results could be that as a consequence of eased borrowing 
conditions, there was a greater misallocation of resources into less profitable projects8. The 
European stock markets had a major boost at the first quarter of 2015 (initial phase of the APP) 
but since then, no significant growth was made, leading to the conclusion that the effect in 
















By applying zero-restrictions upon impact on the first two macro variables – output and prices 
– we are guaranteeing that the effect felt on these variables is not immediate but is reflected 
through the lag order of two. With this, we achieve to similar results (figures 14 and 15) across 
almost all variables but with less pronounced increases on prices in both economies. The 
increase is roughly cut at half: in the euro area the peak is at 0.2% while for the USA the peak 
is at 0.7%. We can compare these values to the 0.4% and to the 1.5% concluded by the model 
without imposing any restrictions. It was also noticed that for the American economy, output 
had not the initial short-lived negative impulse felt in the unrestricted. As a result of the 0 




Figure 14 – Euro area model applying 0 restrictions on Indprod and HICP in lag 1 and using BEIR (1y time 



























The aim of the present dissertation is to evaluate the effects of the QE programs that took place 
in the euro area (between 2014 and 2019) and in the US (between 2008 and 2014). This form 
of unconventional monetary policy has been increasingly applied by several monetary 
authorities and a thorough look into the effects in both macroeconomic indicators and financial 
markets can bring insight on the effectiveness of such programs. Furthermore, through 
performing a comparative analysis between two major central banks as the ECB and the FED, 
we can take conclusions on the relationship between monetary policy decisions (such as 
announcements) and financial markets indicators (such as bond yields, exchange rates and stock 
prices).  
We have seen several transmission channels that can be activated when asset purchase programs 
are taking place and took some conclusions that were in line with recent literature and others 
that were not. An evaluation on the portfolio rebalancing channel and of the exchange rate 
channel was made on both economies: for the euro area and US, there is evidence of portfolio 
rebalancing channel but there is only evidence of the activation of the exchange rate channel in 
the US. Portfolio rebalancing channel activation is demonstrated through the lower bond yields 
that were observed in both economies, with permanent effects after 1 year. We see little 
evidence of a depreciation of the euro as a consequence of an asset purchase shock, but we find 
this effect for the US dollar as a result of the activation of the exchange rate channel. Although 
the effects of euro depreciation are not confirmed in the main VAR analysis, we see sign of 
depreciation on the daily frequency analysis around the ECB announcement dates. 
As mentioned, to yield the results on both QE programs, the standard VAR methodology was 
employed as it is shown by previously mentioned authors to be an appropriate method to capture 
the effect of an asset purchase shock. It was also carried an event study analysis on the behavior 
of some financial market variables around important announcement dates to evaluate whether 
the effect is strong and/or persistent. For the euro area, we see strong effects around the 
announcements of 22 January 2015 and 9 March 2015 for the three variables tested, in line with 
what one would expect, i.e., a decrease in 10-year government bond yields and the exchange 
rate and an increase in stock prices. For the USA, there is clear evidence of a boost in stock 
prices and lower government bond yield around the 25 November 2008 announcement by the 
Fed. It was also concluded that during the just mentioned announcement dates, there was a 




also noticed a decrease in the systemic stress indicator, pointing indeed to effective policy 
measures aimed at smoothing financial market tensions. 
Regarding the VAR analysis results, we have concluded that an asset purchase shock that is 
equal to 1% of GDP results in small but persistent increase in both output and inflation for both 
economies. These results are in line with the two monetary authorities’ objective of boosting 
the economy and prices, but these increases were stronger in the US. A possible interpretation 
for the less strong effect on the euro area could be that the purchases done by the ECB were 
increased gradually as seen in section 3 (figure 1) and not by phases as made by the Federal 
Reserve (figure 2). There is a difference in how the two Central Banks performed the asset 
purchases that may create undesirable effects in how economic agents react and causing lack 
of efficiency of the policies. Another possibility could arise from contextual economic 
differences in which the two programs were launched, being the US in great financial distress 
at the beginning of its QE program due to the GFC. The high proportion of Assets/GDP ratio 
can also indicate why the effects on output and prices were lower relatively to the US effects. 
Based on the activation of the portfolio rebalancing channel, the results indicate that the asset 
purchase shock lowered both corporate and government bond yields. Aligned with the daily 
data announcements analysis is the effect on the depreciation of the US dollar that was 
statistically significant in the VAR analysis while for the euro area there is no evidence of such 
depreciation of the domestic currency. The conclusions taken from the positive and persistent 
effects on the US stock prices are expected in light of recent literature (Weale and Wieladek 
(2016)), while the effect on the European stock prices of an asset purchase shock was found not 













Appendix 1 – Change in euro area variables relative to the day prior to ECB’s 
announcement dates  
EURO 
AREA 
EXCH Variation (%) YIELD Variation (basis points) STOCKS Variation (%) 
22/01/2015 93.962 0.077644796 1.090975 1.553 364.051 1.656432638 
26/01/2015 92.0652 -1.942611017 0.930706 -14.4739 372.392 3.985546704 
30/01/2015 92.7118 -1.253926175 0.942022 -13.3423 367.051 2.494143008 
… … … … … … … 
09/03/2015 90.1539 -0.430730287 0.826816 -3.6851 393.19 -0.252166501 
11/03/2015 88.6958 -2.04110934 0.70132 -16.2347 395.485 0.330048911 
16/03/2015 88.7487 -1.982684642 0.720318 -14.3349 400.176 1.520102287 
… … … … … … … 
10/03/2016 92.3659 -1.661870164 0.869759 -6.3276 333.5 -1.661870164 
14/03/2016 93.5705 1.627665597 0.886952 -4.6083 344.656 1.627665597 
17/03/2016 94.3238 0.456159181 0.865821 -6.7214 340.683 0.456159181 
 




Appendix 2 - Change in US variables relative to the day prior to Fed’s announcement 
dates 
USA EXCH Variation (%) YIELD Variation (basis points) STOCKS 
Variation 
(%) 
25/11/2008 109.6542 -0.640353603 2.79 -32 857.39 0.655075662 
27/11/2008 110.0562 -0.27609416 2.6 -51 887.68 4.211032977 
04/12/2008 110.8688 0.460217341 1.98 -113 845.22 -0.773646705 
… …   …   …   
18/03/2009 111.7311 -0.207478515 1.28 -62 794.35 2.085796535 
20/03/2009 109.8714 -1.868467731 1.43 15 768.54 -1.23117257 
27/03/2009 110.5754 -1.239690828 1.38 10 815.94 4.860432838 
… …   …   …   
22/05/2013 101.3535 0.323280235 -0.24 10 1655.35 -0.827362266 
24/05/2013 101.3434 0.313282898 -0.26 8 1649.6 -1.171846917 
30/05/2013 101.5143 0.482445764 -0.05 29 1654.41 -0.883678018 
 
 





Appendix 3 – Euro area model using a lag of 2 (2y time horizon) | Eviews10 
 






Appendix 5 – Euro area model using a lag of 4 (1y time horizon) | Eviews10 
 






Appendix 7 – Euro area model using a lag of 4 (2y time horizon) | Eviews10 
 






Appendix 9 – Euro area model using a lag of 6 (1y time horizon) | Eviews10 
 






Appendix 11 – Euro area model using a lag of 6 (2y time horizon) | Eviews10 
 





Appendix 13 – Euro area model with shock equal to one Cholesky standard deviation 
(1y time horizon) | Eviews10 
 
Appendix 14 – USA model with shock equal to one Cholesky standard deviation (1y time 














Euro Area Data Unit Source 
Industrial Production Index (excluding construction) 
Price Index 
(2015=100) 





HICP (excluding food and energy) 
Price Index 
(2015=100) 
ECB Statistical Data 
Warehouse 
10-year Government bond yield (AAA issuers) Annual yield (%) 
ECB Statistical Data 
Warehouse 
10-year Government bond yield (All issuers) Annual yield (%) 
ECB Statistical Data 
Warehouse 
IBOXX Euro Inflation-Linked (BEIR) Annual yield (%) 
Thomson Reuters 
Eikon 
IBOXX Euro Corporates bond  Annual yield (%) 
Thomson Reuters 
Eikon 
Real Effective Exchange rate (REER) 
Price Index 
(1999Q1=100) 
ECB Statistical Data 
Warehouse 
Eurostoxx600 Europe Price Index 
Thomson Reuters 
Eikon 
ECB APP (purchases under PSPP, CSPP, ABSPP 
and CBPP3) EUR million ECB Website 
Securities of euro area residents EUR million 
ECB Statistical Data 
Warehouse 
Lending to euro area credit institutions related to 
MPOs EUR million 
ECB Statistical Data 
Warehouse 




Appendix 16 – US data sources and units 
US Data Unit Source 
Industrial Production Index 
Price Index 
(2012=100) Fred Website 
Personal Consumption Expenditures USD Billions Fred Website 
10-year Government bond yield Annual yield (%) Fred Website 
10-Year Treasury Inflation-Indexed Security (TIPS) Annual yield (%) Fred Website 
IBOXX USD Corporates Annual yield (%) 
Thomson 
Reuters Eikon 
Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index: Broad Goods 
Price Index (Jan 
97=100) Fred Website 
S&P 500 Composite Price Index 
Thomson 
Reuters Eikon 
Assets: Securities Held Outright (purchases) USD Millions Fred Website 
Assets: Total Assets: Total Assets (Less 
Eliminations from Consolidation) USD Millions Fred Website 
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